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Sammendrag 
Preferansene og vanene som bestemmer dagens handlinger er i mange tilfeller avhengige av tidligere 
valg. I denne artikkelen undersøker jeg hvordan vaner og endogene preferanser påvirker utformingen 
av miljøpolitikk. Et viktig funn er at den optimale prisen på utslipp gjerne er høyere enn den marginale 
miljøskaden utslippene forårsaker når preferansene er endogene. Dette skyldes at prisen på utslipp nå 
har to effekter: (i) internalisere miljøskaden fra produksjon, og (ii) påvirke fremtidige preferanser via 
dagens konsum. Mens (i) alene leder til den vanlige Pigou-skatten vil en eventuell tilstedeværelse av 
(ii) innebære at den optimale skatten er heves ytterligere. Lavere konsum av et forurensende gode i 
dag kan en også redusere ønsket eller avhengigheten av å konsumere dette godet i fremtiden. Det 
synes rimelig å vente at mekanisme (ii) kan være relevant for tema som kjøttkonsum, transport og en 
del fritidsaktiviteter, og mindre relevant i andre tilfeller. Resultatene indikerer at en bør være forsiktige 
med å subsidiere forurensende goder. Årsaken er at subsidiene ikke bare fører til økt forurensing i dag, 
men også økt etterspørsel etter de forurensende godene i fremtiden. Resultatene i dette paperet trekker 
i retning av at IAM modellene brukt av FN’s klimapanel foreslår for høye utslipp av klimagasser. 
 
1 Introduction
The standard approach in intertemporal economic models is to maximize
the present value of the sum (or integral) of a given utility function over the
time horizon. Whereas the arguments in the utility function may change
over time, the functional form and its parameters remain constant. The as-
sumption of a constant utility function is arguably at odds with our intuition
that preferences and current decisions depend on previous experiences and
choices.1
In this paper I investigate environmental policy in the presence of en-
dogenous and time-inconsistent preferences. Endogenous preferences have a
substantial impact on the model dynamics, because current actions influence
future preferences and thereby utility. The foresighted consumer will take
this into account when determining current actions. The optimal time tra-
jectory is achieved if and only if the consumer is perfectly time-consistent.
The reason is that endogenous preferences put a shadow price on consump-
tion, and these shadow prices depend on the valuation of the future. The
suboptimal trajectories do not only differ from the optimal path during the
transition phase between two equilibria, but also the consumption levels in
the new stationary states differ. A key difference is more pollution in the
suboptimal equilibrium. The optimal tax scheme requires a combination of
taxes and subsidies (unless the consumer is perfectly time-consistent), which
may not be available to the regulator. In the case of environmental policy,
a second-best option is a single tax that is above the Pigouvian level (to
compensate for the lack of subsidies to substitute goods under the optimal
tax scheme).
The results in this paper indicate that models used to derive optimal
paths towards the low-emission society, without taking endogenous prefer-
ences into account, may recommend too high emissions. This is not without
relevance as, e.g., the integrated assessment models (IAM) used by the In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to derive optimal paths
towards the low-emission society feature fixed preferences (IPCC, 2014; Ro-
gelj et al., 2018).
This paper is relevant when current consumption affects future prefer-
ences (e.g., habit formation or changes in tastes). Whereas this is arguably
the case for, e.g., food consumption, drugs, leisure activities, health and
musical tastes, it may be less important for other issues. To fix thoughts,
parts of the analysis are framed in a setting where red meat consumption
declines over time to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.2 This is arguably
1"It is nonsense to assume that successive consumptions are independent; the normal
condition is that there is strong complementarity between them" (Hicks, 1965, p. 261).
2Atkin (2013) firmly rejects the hypothesis of no habit formation (i.e., Atkin rejects
the hypothesis that preferences do not depend on past relative prices) in the case of food
consumption in India.
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an important example: A recent UN climate change report (IPCC, 2019) es-
timates that, by 2050, dietary changes involving less red meat consumption
could free up several million square kilometres of land and reduce global CO2
emissions by up to eight billion tons per year, relative to business as usual.
This is roughly equal to the emissions that where avoided in 2018 through
global use of nuclear power, assuming nuclear power plants replace fossil fu-
eled power plants (Nature, 2019). Another case is the transport sector. For
example, you may start to like cycling to work if you use a bicycle instead of
a car or public transport for a period of time. A third example could be the
choice between polluting leisure activities (e.g., shopping or long-distance
travel) and other less polluting leisure activities (e.g., music or outdoor life).
The issue of endogenous preferences may be particularly relevant in contexts
where the time horizon is long, like the case of climate change.
There is a small literature on endogenous preferences and environmental
policy. Mattach et al. (2018) show (in a static model) that, when the in-
troduction of a carbon tax changes consumers’ values, the target-compatible
carbon price must be adjusted by the size of this effect. This paper differs
from Mattach et al. (2018) in several ways. In particular, the present paper
has a dynamic model and preferences are determined by the consumer’s own
consumption choices in previous periods. Mattauch and Hepburn (2016) dis-
cuss normative issues with regulation and climate policy in a setting where
policy measures influence people’s preferences.
Gorman (1967) examines conditions for a stable long-run equilibrium
when preferences are endogenous. Bowles (1998) reviews models and evi-
dence concerning impact of economic institutions on preferences, and dis-
cusses some implications for economic theory and policy analysis.3 Van den
Bijgaart (2018) studies consumption in the presence of endogenous habits
and determines the path of taxes or subsidies that implements first-best
consumption, both when goods are produced competitively and when they
are produced by monopolists. Van den Bijgaart (2018) does not consider
environmental policy and examines a process for habit formation that differs
from the endogenous preferences in the present paper.
Whereas framed in a very different setting, the model mechanisms dis-
cussed in the present paper relates to the literature on rational addiction;
see, e.g., Becker and Murphy (1988), Chaloupka (1991) and Becker (1996).
There are many differences between the present paper and the rational ad-
diction literature. In particular, the present paper features an environmen-
tal externality and models markets for several goods that are linked by the
utility function and the budget constraint. The interaction between the dif-
ferent markets is important for the results. Moreover, whereas the rational
3Dasgupta et al. (2015) and Ulph and Ulph (2021) examine how social interactions
affect consumer preferences and behavior in a setting with environmental damage. Perino
(2015) shows that climate campaigns can create leakage effects if coverage of cap-and-trade
schemes are incomplete.
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addiction literature tends to focus on the case where the consumer ratio-
nally internalizes the addiction caused by consumption of drugs, the present
paper focuses on the case where the consumer fails to internalize the en-
dogenous preference formation. In this respect, Nobel Laureate George A.
Akerlof states the following regarding endogenous preferences and consumer
foresight: "Standard economic analysis is based upon the Benthamite view
that individuals have fixed utilities which do not change. Stigler-Becker and
Becker-Murphy have gone so far as to posit that these utilities do change,
but that individuals are forward looking and thus foresee the changes that
will occur. A more modern view of behavior, based on twentieth-century an-
thropology, psychology, and sociology is that individuals have utilities that
do change and, in addition, they fail fully to foresee those changes or even
recognize that they have occurred." (Akerlof, 1991, p. 17). I refer to Kah-
neman and Tversky (1979), Kahneman et al. (1991) and Cartwright (2011)
for further discussion on perfectly informed and rational human behavior.
Endogenous preferences have so far received limited attention in the liter-
ature on environmental economics and climate change, but the results in the
present paper are somewhat similar to the mechanisms that occur in the case
of convex investment costs, a private discount rate that is above the social
discount rate, and long-lived capital (see Storrøsten, 2020). A contribution
to the environmental economics literature given by the present paper is that
the optimal emission tax is above marginal environmental damage in cases
where preferences are determined by earlier consumption and experiences.
This implies that emissions will be above the optimal emissions level with
standard Pigouvian taxes in these cases.
The analytical analysis is in Section 2. Endogenous preferences and time-
inconsistent behavior have important effects on the consumer’s intertemporal
optimization whether a negative environmental externality is present or not.
I therefore present the model without a negative externality first, and then
introduce the externality in Section 2.1. Section 3 presents a stylized numer-
ical illustration. It is primarily included to ease the understanding of the
model dynamics. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical analysis
Consider a partial equilibrium model with two goods x and d and t ∈ T ={
1, 2, ..., t
}
time periods. The representative consumer has a constant elas-
ticity of substitution (CES) utility function given by:





in period t. Here the α’s represent the value of consumption shares and the
substitution elasticity between the two goods is 1/ (1 − ρ). Assume that dt
6











where βt is value of consumption share in period t and the elasticity of
substitution is 1/(1 − θ). We assume ρ, θ 6= 0, ρ, θ < 1 and α, β ∈ (0, 1).
The utility function u (∙) given by equations (1) and (2) is a standard nested
CES function, except for the time dependence of the consumption share
parameter βt.
In the following we will focus on the case where yt and zt are substitutes,
but the formal analysis remains the same whether yt and zt are substitutes
or complements. xt is a composite good that represents all the other goods
in the consumption bundle.
I let βt be endogenous to capture endogenous preferences in the sense that
the more of a given good you consume today, the more of that good you will
prefer to consume in the future. As argued in the introduction, endogenous
preferences will be relevant for some goods (e.g., food preferences, transport
and recreational activities) and less important for other goods. In this paper,
we will consider goods for which endogenous preferences is relevant for the
value share βt in the lower CES nest in equation (2). Let βt be determined
by the following process:
βt = f (Bt) , (3)
where f (∙) is an increasing function (∂f/∂Bt ≡ fB ∈ (0, 1)) satisfying
limBt→1 f (Bt) < 1 and limBt→0 f (Bt) > 0 with:






, B0 = B. (4)
Here v ∈ [0, 1] and B ∈ (0, 1) are constants. We define β0 = β = f(B̄).
The shape on f(∙) determines how previous consumption choices affect the
value of consumption share parameter β in equation (2). The restrictions
on f(∙) capture the assumption that the more of a given good you consume
today, the more you will want to consume that good in the future. The
difference equation (4) specifies the process for the function argument Bt
in equation (3). The current value of Bt equals the previous value, Bt−1,
plus a ’correction term’. The speed of the correction process is determined
by ν. Specifically Bt = yt−1/ (yt−1 + zt−1) for all t ∈ T if v = 1, whereas
Bt = B for all t ∈ T if v = 0. Note that equation (4) implies that Bt
converges towards ys/ (ys + zs) when v > 0 and ys/ (ys + zs) is constant
(s ∈ T , s > t). The utility function in period t ∈ T can be written (cf.,
equations 1, 2 and 3):
u(xt, yt, zt; Bt) =
(













The utility function (5) in itself remains constant, only consumption levels
and the state variable Bt changes over the time horizon.
I assume that the goods xt, yt and zt are supplied by competitive firms
with constant returns to scale production technology. Hence the consumer
prices in period t are given by pgt = sg + τgt, where g = {x, y, z} and
sg and τgt are marginal production costs and taxes on good g in period t,
respectively.4 Further, disposable income is given by mt = m − τmt, where
m is (finite) income and τmt is a lump-sum tax. A negative value on τgt
indicates a subsidy to consumption, whereas τmt < 0 indicates a lump sum
transfer. The consumer’s budget constraint is given by:
mt ≥ pxtxt + pytyy + pztzt. (6)
Non-satiation in the CES utility function (5) implies that the budget con-
straint (6) must be binding in all periods.
The consumer maximizes the present value of utility over the whole time
horizon, given perfect information about current and future prices and taxes.
Traditional exponential discounting implies that human preferences are time-
consistent. As pointed out by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, p. 103), casual
observation, introspection, and psychological research all suggest that the
assumption of time consistency is counterfactual. Specifically, it ignores the
human tendency to grab immediate rewards and to avoid immediate costs.
For example, suppose a person is given two choices. First, choose between
one apple today and two apples tomorrow. Second, choose between one apple
in one year and two apples in one year plus one day. While some people may
be tempted to select one apple today on the first choice, no one would select
one apple in a year in the second choice. Yet if the rate of discount is
exponential and time consistent, the choices are formally identical.5
In this paper I will assume that the impatience described above is sub-
optimal. Specifically, I assume that optimal climate policy must be time-
consistent. Whereas this is reasonable in the case of environmental regu-
lation, and particularly in the case of climate change which will affect the
earths’ population several generations into the future, it may be more ques-
tionable applied to other issues (like musical tastes or recreational habits).6
Present-biased time-inconsistent preferences can be modelled using hy-
perbolic discounting. In this paper, I use a form developed by Phelps and
4It is equivalent whether the taxes are placed on the consumer or the producer in this
model.
5This example is taken from Thaler (1981, p. 202), who refers to it as "Strotz’s famous
dynamic inequality" (see Strotz, 1955-56). See also Loewenstein (1992) on exponential
discounting in economics.
6Exponential (and time-consistent) discounting has been criticized for putting very low
values on future welfare (Karp, 2005). In this respect, note that the important driver in
the present paper is just that the less than perfectly time-consistent consumer does not
fully internalize the endogenous preference formation (the results are valid δ = 1), and
Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 are derived for a myopic consumer).
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Pollak (1968) and later used by, e.g., O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). The
intertemporal utility function with hyperbolic discounting is given within the
square brackets in equation (7) below. Here γ ∈ [0, 1] represents a bias for
the present (if γ < 1), whereas δ ∈ (0, 1] represents the standard exponential
time consistent discounting. Note that, as seen from period s, the discount
factor applied from period s to period s+1 is γδ, whereas the discount factor
from period s + 1 to s + 2 is δ. Further, γ = 0 and γ = 1 yields myopic and
time-consistent preferences, respectively.7




[u(x1, y1, z1; B1) + γ
t∑
t=2
δt−1u(xt, yt, zt; Bt)], (7)
subject to equations (3), (4), (5) and (6). In this model the only reason
why current decisions in period t have influence over the subsequent periods
t + s (s = 1, 2, ..., t̄ − t) is the process for endogenous preferences (cf. equa-
tions 3 and 4).8 Hence time inconsistency, as measured by γ, only affects
the total value of discounted welfare (V in equation 7) via the endogenous
preferences. I will focus on the two extremes: the myopic consumer with
γ = 0 and the time-consistent consumer with γ = 1.9 The path of the time-
consistent consumer coincides with the solution obtained by a social planner
that maximizes social welfare.
The competitive equilibrium is characterized by the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. The interior solution competitive equilibrium for the time-
consistent consumer (γ = 1) solving (7) is characterized by equations (3),
7O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) differentiate between two types of time-inconsistent
consumers (0 < γ < 1): Sophisticates and Naifs (see also Strotz, 1955-1956, and Pollak,
1968). The sophisticates realize that their future selves will be time-inconsistent and
continue procrastinating unpleasant actions. The Naifs, on the other hand, (wrongly)
believe that they will be time consistent and fully rational in future time periods. The
present paper assumes Naifs, but the distinction is less important as I focus on the extreme
cases γ = {0, 1}.
8I.e., there are no capital stocks, endogenous growth or similar characteristics of dy-
namic models.
9I do this because (i) these two cases capture the most interesting results (i.e., market-
failure when γ = 0 and no need for regulation when γ = 1), and (ii) the intermediate
cases 0 < γ < 1 yield time inconsistent trajectories with re-optimization in each period
which significantly complicates the analytical analysis (see Appendix A).
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(4), (6) and:
uxt − λtpxt = 0, (8a)
uyt − λtpyt +
μtvzt
δt−1 (yt + zt)
2 = 0, (8b)
uzt − λtpzt −
μtvyt
δt−1 (yt + zt)
2 = 0, (8c)
δt−1fBtuβt + μt (1 − v) = μ
i
t−1, (8d)
μt̄ = 0. (8e)
For the myopic consumer (γ = 0), the interior solution competitive equilib-
rium solving (7) is characterized by equations (3), (4), (6), (8a), (8b) and
(8c) with μt ≡ 0 for all t ∈ T .
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intermediate cases with γ ∈ (0, 1) yield time-inconsistent solutions
involving re-optimization in each time period, see the proof of Lemma 1 in
Appendix A. The derivatives ugt in equations (8a), (8b) and (8c) are the
marginal utilities of the utility function (5) in time period t w.r.t. good
gt = {xt, yt, zt}. They are all positive. Further, uβt in equation (8d) is
the derivative of the utility function (5) in period t w.r.t. the endogenous






Xt, where Xt is
positive (see the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix A for the exact expressions
for Xt and the derivatives in Lemma 1). λt is the shadow price on the budget
constraint (6). It is the rate at which the optimal value of the objective
function (denoted V in equation 7) changes following a marginal increase
in disposable income mt. Note that λt is strictly positive given our utility
function (5), finite disposable income mt and pgt > 0 (for all g and t). The
adjoint (or co-state) variable μt is the first order approximate change in the
value function V in (7) caused by a marginal increase in the state variable
Bt. It can be interpreted as a shadow price on Bt. Equation (8e) is the
transversality condition associated with a free terminal value on the state
variable Bt̄ (which determines βt̄ via equation 3).
The solution to the myopic consumer’s optimization problem in any pe-
riod t ∈ T is identical to that of a static maximization problem where utility
(given by equation 5) is maximized subject to the budget constraint (6).
We have μt ≡ 0 for all t ∈ T for the myopic consumer. Whereas the fully
rational time-consistent consumer type may be most familiar in economics,
the myopic consumer may be at least as good an approximation to actual
behavior in this particular setting (where the only dynamic element is the
endogenous preferences).10
10In a discussion of G. Becker’s book "Accounting for tastes" (1998) and the theory of
rational addiction, Elster (1997, p. 754) writes: "The only place I can find for motivated
preference change is in the context of weakness of will".
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Suppose there is a one-time change in consumer prices at time s > 1
such that the rate pzt/pyt > pz1/py1 for all t ≥ s (e.g., an increase in pzt
or a decrease in pyt). Moreover, assume that we at time t = 1 are in a
stationary state and let v ∈ (0, 1). Then a (at least marginally) higher
rate y1/z1 today increases future utility. The reason is that the utility from
a higher rate yt/zt (t > 1) in the future, caused by the one-time change
in consumer prices, increases in the current rate y1/z1 due the endogenous
preference formation process. This is captured in Lemma 1 with μ1 > 0,
which pulls in the direction of more consumption of y1 (cf., equation 8b)
and less consumption of z1 (cf., equation 8c). It follows that the rate yt/zt
will increase monotonously over time, before stabilizing on a new and higher
stationary state level. Conversely, we would have μ1 < 0 if prices changed
such that the rate yt/zt decreased monotonously over time, pulling in the
opposite direction of consumption of y1 and z1. Note that the consumer is
willing to accept a lower utility level in the current period in order to increase
the utility in future time periods, and that the adjustment starts before the
actual price change takes place (given γ > 0).
Lemma 1 implies the following result:
Proposition 1. Suppose consumption of y changes at least once over
the time horizon and let preferences be endogenous. Then the optimal time
trajectory will not be realized in competitive equilibrium unless the consumer
is perfectly time consistent (i.e., unless γ = 1).
Proof. See Appendix A.
It is the combined presence of time-inconsistency and endogenous pref-
erences that causes suboptimal behavior in Proposition 1. Endogenous pref-
erences in itself does not cause suboptimal outcomes if the consumer is able
to perfectly internalize how current actions affects future preferences, and
thereby utility.
Suppose the consumer is time-inconsistent. Then it is possible for the
regulator to induce the optimal time trajectory by changing the consumer
prices with taxes and subsidies. The time trajectory for the taxes can be
complicated, however, especially when 0 < γ < 1. Let superscripts ’opt’ and
’myo’ refer to the equilibrium values for the time-consistent (optimal path)
and myopic type of consumer, respectively (as given by Lemma 1). Further,
let τ optht denote a tax on variable h = {y, z,m} in period t. Then we have the
following result:
Proposition 2. Suppose preferences are endogenous. Then the following
taxes and subsidies is required to induce the optimal trajectory in the case of
11












































Suppose λoptt ≈ λ
myo
t .

























Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that net tax income, −τytyt − τztzt, is added to mt as a lump sum
transfer (or lump sum tax if tax income is negative). This lump sum transfer
ensures that the scheme in Proposition 2 is revenue neutral (the tax income
is transferred back to the representative consumer). Remember that sy and
sz are the production costs of goods y and z, respectively.
A caveat with Proposition 2 is that the optimal tax scheme is very infor-
mation intensive. As such, it may be argued that there is an inconsistency
in the analysis behind Proposition 2. That is, whereas the consumer is
time-inconsistent, the regulator behaves time-consistent, and is well enough
informed to implement taxes that correct for the time-inconsistent behavior
of the consumers as given in Proposition 2. A more modest implication of
Proposition 2 is that, at least, care should be taken when subsidizing goods
or services which have negative externalities related to them; i.e., when do-
ing the opposite of the policy suggested by Proposition 2. The reason is
that this will make it more difficult to reduce consumption of these goods
later due the endogenous preference formation process (see also Section 2.1).
Proposition 2 may also provide a possible rationale for non-uniform rates on
taxes that are primarily implemented for generating state revenues, like the
value added tax (VAT).12
11We typically have λoptt > λ
myo
t , because the rational consumer perfectly maximizes
welfare V (in 7), whereas the myopic consumer does not take the endogenous βt into
account. The possible exception is in the period after a price change has been announced,
but before it has been enacted (e.g., periods 1, 2, ..., 7 in the numerical simulation), where
the time-consistent consumer sacrifices current utility to increase future welfare.
12There are several examples on sumptuary taxes implemented to mitigate use of certain
goods deemed harmful to society and individuals, like alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and
12
2.1 Environmental policy and endogenous preferences
Consider the case where consumption or production of good z causes a neg-
ative externality, where marginal damage is φt per unit of zt produced and
consumed. For example, z may be consumption of red meat, y vegetables
and fish, and x a basket of all the other goods.13 A rough calculation sug-
gests that the US retail price of beef would increase with around 35 percent
if emissions related to production of beef were priced at the Biden adminis-
tration’s social cost of carbon (see Appendix A).
Propositions 1 and 2 have the following corollary in the case of environ-
mental policy:
Corollary 1. Suppose preferences are endogenous. Then the optimal
time trajectory will not be realized in competitive equilibrium with a tax equal
to environmental damage (φt) unless the consumer is perfectly time consis-
tent (γ = 1). In the case of a myopic consumer (γ = 0), the following taxes
















where τmyoyt and τ
myo
zt are given in Proposition 2.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The optimal time trajectory can be achieved with a Pigou tax if and
only if the consumer is perfectly time-consistent. Otherwise, the optimal
time trajectory requires a tax above the Pigouvian tax level on the dirty
good z, and a subsidy on consumption of the clean good y.
We need three taxes to correct for the single externality of environmental
pollution caused by production or consumption of z in Corollary 1.14 This
is because the endogenous preferences create additional externalities in the
consumer’s optimization problem (unless γ = 1). A numerical illustration of
the optimal taxes in Corollary 1 is graphed in Figure 1 in Section 3.
As compared with a standard Pigou tax, the price on the polluting good
z is higher and the price on the substitute good y is lower under the optimal
vehicles emitting excessive pollutants (e.g., in the Scandinavian countries). There are
also examples of tax breaks on goods deemed to have a positive effect on society, like the
reduced UK rate of VAT on certain energy-saving products like isolation.
13A study by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (Gerber et al., 2013) es-
timated that total annual emissions from animal agriculture (production emissions plus
land-use change) were about 14.5 percent of all human emissions. Beef and cattle milk
production accounted for 41 and 20 percent of the sector’s emissions, respectively. See
also Wolf et al. (2017) and https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02409-7.
14The Tinbergen Rule states that the regulator needs one instrument per target variable.
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tax scheme. Hence, the optimal time trajectory involves less pollution than
the suboptimal path that is implemented by a standard Pigou tax (assuming
a myopic consumer). The optimal tax system changes the preferences so
that consumers prefer relatively more of the clean good y, and less of the
polluting good z. This preference change is completely endogenized by the
time-consistent consumer type (γ = 1).
Suppose that x is red meat and y is fish and vegetables (and that red
meat is relatively emission intensive as compared to fish and vegetables).
In this case, Corollary 1 suggests that the regulator should tax consump-
tion of red meat above the Pigouvian level, whereas consumption of fish and
vegetables should be subsidized. One could also consider other ways to moti-
vate consumption of fish and vegetables, e.g. advertising. Another example,
taken from the transport sector, could be tolls and cheaper public transport
tickets. Better cycle path networks and public transport offers are also ex-
amples of measures that can make more people travel in an environmentally
friendly way.15
Corollary 1 suggests that models used to derive the optimal path for
carbon emissions without taking endogenous preferences into account sug-
gests too high carbon emissions, given that preferences are endogenous as
modelled in this paper. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the integrated
assessment models (IAM) used by the IPCC to derive optimal paths towards
the low-emission society feature fixed preferences (see IPCC, 2014). Whereas
this is probably fine for the lion share of sectors modelled by these IAMs,
it may be problematic regarding, e.g., food consumption, travel and certain
luxury polluting goods.
Assume that the regulator only has access to a tax on the z-good asso-
ciated with the negative externality. Then we have the following:
Corollary 2. Suppose preferences are endogenous. Then the second-
best tax on good zt is above marginal environmental damage (φt), unless the
consumer is perfectly time consistent (γ = 1).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Corollary 2 states that a tax above the Pigouvian level may be a second-
best alternative to the tax scheme in Corollary 1, if the optimal scheme
is unavailable to the regulator.16 Whereas welfare will be lower with only
a single instrument, as compared with the optimal scheme in Corollary 1,
the second-best tax may improve the outcome as compared with a standard
15The examples with advertising and infrastructure differ from the subsidy sy in Corol-
lary 1, but the generalization is straightforward. The point with the subsidy is to increase
current consumption of y (and reduce z). Other measures that accomplishes this will have
the same effect on future preferences.
16Mattauch and Hepburn (2016) point out that optimal levels of greenhouse gas emis-
sions and the design of policies to reduce emissions are affected by preference endogeneity.
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Pigou tax. The second-best tax tends to be above the first-best optimal
tax on the polluting good z, because it needs to compensate for the lack of
subsidy to consumption of the substitute good y. Even though the second-
best tax can in principle fully control the price ratio pzt/pyt, a too high tax
on z will increase the disturbance caused by the tax in the upper CES nest
(cf., equation 1).
Corollaries 1 and 2 indicate that care should be taken when subsidizing
goods that cause environmental damage, such as beef production.17 The
reason is that the cost of reducing consumption of the z-good may be larger
due to the endogenous preference formation process. That is, if consumption
of z has to decline in the future, because of pollution, it may be harder do
so because current subsidies cause the consumers to get used to enjoying the
polluting z-good.
3 Numerical illustration
In this section I present a very stylized numerical model to shed some light
on the dynamics of the system of equations presented in Lemma 1. The
simulation solves the model consisting of equations (1) to (7) with α =
0.3658, β = 1/2, ρ = θ = 1/2, ν = 1/4, δ = 0.9873, γ = {0, 1} and t = 500
(approximating the infinite horizon solution for the first 100 time periods).
The model is calibrated such that the initial budget shares of x, y, and z at
time t = 0 are 0.4, 0.3 and 0.3, respectively. These budget shares corresponds
roughly to the shares of US food consumption if z is meats, y is fish, fruits
and vegetables, and x is the rest (including cereals, dairy, oils and fats). As
such, the numerical illustration may be loosely interpreted as continuing the
example from Section 2.1. A difference is that the negative externality is
zero for the first seven time-periods (I do this because it emphasizes that it
is optimal to start the changes in consumption even before the price change
or externality occurs when endogenous preferences are present). The reader
may interpret one time period as one quarter, in which case the quarterly
discount factor is equivalent to a yearly discount rate of 5 percent. Under this
interpretation the new habits are largely ingrained after a couple of years,
which is somewhat faster than indicated by the results in Atkin (2013) for
food consumption in India.
17Significant subsidies are handed out to the meat industry. For example, Amer-
ican governments spend 38 USD billion each year to subsidize meat and dairy,
but only 0.04 percent of that (17 USD million) to subsidize fruits and vegetables
(https://meatonomics.com/2013/09/28/10-things-i-wish-all-americans-knew-about-
the-meat-dairy-industries/). Nearly a fifth of the EU’s total budget goes to sup-




Let the economy at time t = 0 be in a stationary state, such that we would




if consumer prices and disposable income mt remained
constant for all t ∈ T . We examine the optimal consumption patterns in
the case of an anticipated one-time 35 percent increase in the supply cost of
good z in time period t = 8 (the supply cost increases because the negative
externality is internalized in the production cost).18 All other parameters
remain constant. We also derive the first- and second-best taxes in the case
of a myopic consumer. For ease of exposition most results are presented in
percentage changes from the initial stationary state level at time t = 0 (i.e.,
before the numerical model starts running). Some changes occur in the first
period t = 1 under first- and second-best taxes, so the time trajectories do
not all start at zero in period 1.
Figure 1 (left) graphs the optimal consumption patterns of the three
goods (’opt’). This path can be implemented by the optimal tax scheme
given in Corollary 1 if the consumer is myopic (γ = 0), or by a standard
Pigou tax if the consumer is time-consistent (γ = 1). Hence, the graphs
denoted ’opt’ refer to both the consumption paths of a perfectly rational
and time-consistent consumer facing a Pigou tax, and the path of a myopic
consumer facing the optimal tax scheme in Corollary 1. Figure 1 also graphs
the consumption paths of a myopic consumer facing a Pigou tax (’pig’), and
a myopic consumer facing a second-best tax (’SB’) (i.e., the tax on z that
maximizes welfare V in equation (7) given that the regulator is unable to
put taxes on the goods x and y, see Section 2.1).
Figure 1: Consumption levels (left) and undiscounted prices including taxes
(right). First 50 time periods. Some graphs overlap
18Hence the supply cost of z depends on t in the numerical simulation, and satisfies
szt = sz for t < 8 and szt = sz(1 + 0.35) for t ≥ 8.
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Substantial changes in consumption levels occur along the optimal tra-
jectory before the price change takes place in period t = 8. In contrast,
the myopic consumer does not change consumption patterns before the price
change is implemented in period t ≥ 8 under Pigou taxation. The differences
between the trajectories are not limited to the transition, but also the new
stationary state is influenced; i.e., the new stationary state features markedly
less consumption of zt and higher consumption of yt along the optimal path
than the trajectory for a myopic consumer facing a standard Pigou tax.19
We also observe that consumption levels are quite close to the optimal
trajectory in the case of a second-best tax on z only. The difference between
welfare under the second-best tax and the optimal tax scheme increases in α
(the share of the composite good x in the utility function (1)), and approaches
zero as α approaches zero; i.e., as the model converges towards the case with
two goods y and z only.
Figure 1 (right) graphs the optimal tax scheme and the second-best tax
scheme in the case of a myopic consumer. It also graphs the standard Pigou
tax. The producer prices are constant and equal to marginal cost, so the
changes in consumer prices in Figure 1 are all caused by the taxes. Note
that the second best tax is slightly higher than the optimal tax τ optz , because
it has to compensate for the lack of subsidy to the substitute good y. The
change in the price py is zero under the second-best and Pigou tax schemes.
The price px is constant under all the tax schemes.
Figure 2: Utility levels (left) and shadow prices right). Undiscounted values.
First 50 time periods
Figure 2 (left) plots the changes in utility levels under the three tax
19Around period t = 450 the difference starts a gradual decline, but it remains non-zero
even in the final period t = 500 (because the preferences formation process in equation
(4) is sluggish when v < 1).
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regimes. The net tax revenue is recycled back to the consumer, but utility
declines because of the negative externality (modelled equivalently with an
increase in the supply cost of good z when 7 < t). The optimal and second-
best paths trade-off utility in the early periods to increase utility later along
the trajectory.
Figure 2 (right) graphs the shadow price μ on the endogenous preferences
state variable B along the optimal path, and the shadow prices on the budget
constraints under the three tax regimes, λ. The shadow prices on the budget
constraints decline in period t = 8 because a marginal increase in monetary
endowment gives the consumer less goods, and thereby utility, after period
t = 7. The undiscounted shadow price (μ) remains constant until the model
values are affected by the end of the time horizon in period t = 500. The
undiscounted shadow prices on the budget constraints (λ) remain constant
for all time periods after the new preferences have been ingrained.20 Note
that Figure 2 graphs the undiscounted values (discounted shadow prices and
utility decline over time).
4 Concluding remarks
I have examined the effects of endogenous and time-inconsistent preferences
in a dynamic model with environmental policy. The optimal time trajectory
is achieved by a standard Pigou tax if and only if the consumer is perfectly
time-consistent. Suboptimal trajectories differ from the optimal path during
the transition phase and in the new stationary state. The tax scheme that
can induce the optimal trajectory requires a combination of taxes and sub-
sidies. If only a tax on the polluting good is available, a second-best option
may be a tax above the Pigouvian level. A key implication of the present
paper is that the optimal tax on carbon emissions may be above the social
cost of carbon.
The results in this paper do not hinge on time-inconsistent preferences
per se. The important point is that endogenous preferences cause an exter-
nality unless the consumer perfectly internalizes the endogenous preference
formation. In particular, it can be shown that a too high discount rate (i.e.,
that the consumers operate with a discount factor that is above the social dis-
count rate) leads to very similar results as the presence of time-inconsistent
behavior.
A caveat with the present analysis is that it is demanding to estimate how
important endogenous preferences are in matters concerning environmental
policy, also with regard to the magnitude of the mechanisms identified in this
paper.21 Also, while hyperbolic discounting may provide a better descrip-
20Very small changes in all shadow prices is present as the endogenous preferences
parameter Bt adjusts.
21See Laporte et al. (2017) for some challenges in estimating the related rational addic-
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tion of intertemporal choice than exponential discounting, researchers have
demonstrated patterns of choice that seem anomalous also from the frame-
work of hyperbolic discounting; see e.g. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992),
Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) and Roelofsma (1996). Last, regulation in a
setting where the government can influence people’s preferences raises some
ethical issues. This discussion is beyond the scope of the present paper. I
refer to Mattauch and Hepburn (2016) for more on this topic in a setting
with environmental policy.
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Appendix A: Proofs and calculations
Proof of Lemma 1: The maximization problem (7) can be solved as an op-
timal control problem over discrete time with mixed constraints (it is mixed
because of the budget constraint (6)). Note that whereas Bt (and, hence,
βt, cf. equation (3)) depends on the pair (xt−1, yt−1), Bt is independent of
(xt, yt) (cf. equation (4)). We define the Lagrangian function:
L (xt, yt, zt; Bt) = H (xt, yt, zt; Bt) + λ (mt − pxtxt − pytyy − pztzt) ,
where H (∙) is the Hamiltonian associated with the problem (7) s.t. equation
(3) and λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the problem (7) s.t.
equation (6). A social planner that maximizes welfare (V in equation 7) face
the budget constraint mt = sxxt + syyy + pztzt, which is identical to the
consumer’s budget constraint (6) when all taxes are zero (the firms supply
the goods at marginal cost sg). Hence, the Lagrangian above, with γ = 1,
also solves the time-consistent social planner’s problem.
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Let γδ > 0. Then the Hamiltonian is given by:
Ht =
{








, ∀t < t̄,
u (xt, yt, zt; Bt) , t = t̄,
where μt is the adjoint (or co-state) variable associated with the state vari-
able Bt. We observe that the marginal utility of the goods g = {x, y, z}
satisfies limg→0 (∂u (∙) /∂g) = ∞ for our assumptions about the parameters
entering the CES utility function (5) (see expressions for the partial deriva-
tives below). Hence we will have an interior solution. We further observe that
non-satiation in the CES utility function implies that the budget constraint
will hold with strict equality.
The necessary conditions for solving the mixed constraints problem (7)











































+ μt (1 − v) ,
μT = 0,
The last line is the transversality condition associated with a free state vari-
able βT . The above system of equations with γ = 1 constitutes Lemma 1.
Note that the system of equations (9) with γ = 1 characterizes the socially
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Lemma for the time-inconsistent consumer (0 < γ < 1): When γ ∈ (0, 1)
the system of equations (9) is time-inconsistent. That is, if solved in period
s, the values for the variables in future periods t > s + 1 will be changed
because the consumer re-optimize in period s + 1. (The reason is that the
discounting between two periods s + 1 and s + 2 is δ as seen from period s,
and γδ as seen from period s + 1.) Suppose we are in period s ∈ T . Then
Lemma 1 gives the solution to the problem (7) with γ ∈ (0, 1) for xs, ys and
zs, but not for periods t > s. Therefore, solving (7) with γ ∈ (0, 1) over the
whole time horizon t ∈ T requires us to solve t̄ problems (of which t̄ − 1 is
dynamic and the last in period t̄ is static). Suppose we are in some period
s ∈ T \ {t̄ − 1}. Then we observe from the system of equations (9) that
a larger γ will have very similar effects on (xs, ys, zs) as a larger discount
factor δ. But the consumption path for the periods t > s will be affected
differently by γ and δ due to the inconsistent time preferences.
Lemma for the myopic consumer (γδ = 0): The myopic consumer solves
(7) subject to the budget constraint (6), which is a simple static optimization
problem. The associated Lagrangian is:
Lmyo =
(
αxρt + (1 − α)
(







+λ (mt − pxtxt − pytyt − pztzt)


















− λpz ≤ 0
0 ≤ mt − pxx − pyy − pzz
which must hold with strict inequality in optimum, because of non-satiation
in the CES utility function and limg→0 (ug) = ∞. Note that this system of
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equations is equal to the the system consisting of the first order conditions
w.r.t. xt, yt and zt in (9) with μt ≡ 0 and the budget constraint (6). In
this case βt is still determined by equations (3) and (4), but this process is
treated as exogenous by the myopic consumer.
Proof of Proposition 2: Lemma 1 with γ = 1 characterizes the socially
optimal path. The taxes necessary for the myopic consumer’s consumption






































m − τmyomt − τyyt − τzzt = m,
where we have poptyt = sy, p
opt
zt = sz, p
myo
yt = sy + τy and p
myo
zt = sz + τz
(no taxes for the time-consistent consumer, τ opty = τ
opt
z = τ ratmt = 0). This
ensures that the partial derivatives in Lemma 1 is equal for the myopic and
the time-consistent consumer types. Rearranging yields Proposition 2.
Proof of Corollary 1: Let the social cost of good z equal the supply cost
sz plus a negative externality φ. Then socially optimal trajectory still solves
Lemma 1, but with pzt = sz + φ. Corollary 1 then follows directly from
Proposition 2.
Proof of Corollary 2: This is the same case as in Corollary 1, except
for the additional constraint that τmyoyt = 0. This extra constraint does not
change the sign on τmyozt > 0, because the term fBtuβt in equation (8d) does
not change sign. The economic intuition is that a (marginally) larger value
on β increases future utility, which again implies that a larger value on B1
increases future utility. Hence, the shadow price on B1 (i.e., μ1) is positive,
because higher consumption of y1 (or lower consumption of z1) increases fu-
ture utility.
Price of beef and CO2 emissions: The retail price of 100 percent ground
beef in 2020 was 3.95 USD per pound (https://www.statista.com/statistics/236776/retail-
price-of-ground-beef-in-the-united-states/). Average emissions per kg beef is
60 kilograms (https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidrvetter/2020/10/05/got-
beef-heres-what-your-hamburger-is-doing-to-the-climate/?sh=7ae7b0da5206).
The Biden administrations estimate of the social cost of carbon is 51USD per
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t̄ sx, sy,sz δ γ v α β0 m ρ, θ φt(t ≤ 7) φt(t > 7)
500 1 0.98726 0 or 1 0.2 0.3658 0.5 3.33 0.5 0 0.35
Table 1: Parameters in the numerical illustration.
ton (https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cost-of-carbon-pollution-pegged-
at-51-a-ton/). The very rough calculation is as follows: Price of one kg beef
= 3.95/0.4536 (US average 2020 retail price per kg beef) + 60*51/1000 (CO2
cost per kg beef) = 11.79.
Appendix B: The numerical model
The simulation solves the model consisting of equations (1) to (7) with the
values given in Table 1. For the f(∙) function I used the cumulative Cauchy
distribution with scale/shape parameter equal to 0.7. I also imposed non-
binding upper and lower bounds on β (equal to 0.75 and 0.5) to ease the
numerical computation. The numerical model is solved in GAMS (numerical
software, GAMS version 24.8.3). Partly as a nonlinear optimization problem
(NLP) using the Conopt solver, and partly as a mixed complementarity
problem (MCP) using the Path solver. The GAMS code is available from
the author on request.
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